No deal for me|
No deal for me
This is not my kind of cake. An essay of deterministic models of political behavior. I could not get any touch of it. Therefore no chance for writing a review.
Huomautukset Remarks ЗамечанияPagetop
|Parametre lines at the beginning of the reader notes|
|2. 1,403,403,eco,eng,20211119,20211225,2,Hannu Nurmi: Models of Political Economy||???|
|3. Amazon Link to source of purchased ebook...||???|
|4. eng Link to Ajk review at source of purchased ebook...||???|
|17||000101||1.1 Suggested reading|
|19||0002||2 What are we aiming at?|
|19||000201||2.1 Explaining political economy|
|25||000202||2.2 Building theories|
|31||000204||2.4 Interpreting acts|
|33||000205||2.5 Normative and factual models|
|36||000206||2.6 Suggested reading|
|37||0003||3 Homo æconomicus|
|37||000301||3.1 The role of assumptions in theory|
|43||000302||3.2 Aspects of rationality|
|46||000303||3.3 Making choices under certainty|
|51||000304||3.4 Choices under risk|
|58||000305||3.5 Choices under uncertainty|
|64||000306||3.6 Axioms of rational behavior|
|78||000307||3.7 Suggested reading|
|80||000308||4.1 Classic paradoxes|
|91||000309||4.2 The prospect theory|
|96||000310||4.3 Further anomalies|
|104||000311||4.4 Suggested reading|
|79||0004||4 Economic man under attack|
|105||0005||5 Games: descriptions and solutions|
|112||000501||5.2 Strategies and extensive form|
|130||000503||5.4 Subgames and trembles|
|136||000504||5.5 Special games|
|156||000505||5.6 Reputation makes a difference|
|162||000506||5.7 … and much hinges upon the quality of information|
|167||000507||5.8 The role of two-person game theory|
|171||000508||5.9 Suggested reading|
|173||0006||6 Bargaining and coalitions|
|173||000601||6.1 Classic solutions|
|185||000602||6.2 Stability, core and bargaining sets|
|192||000603||6.3 Values for n-person games|
|197||000604||6.4 Applications to European institutions|
|200||000605||6.5 Power and preferences|
|205||000606||6.6 Suggested reading|
|207||0007||7 Decision making in committees|
|207||000701||7.1 Basic concepts|
|209||000702||7.2 Aggregating opinions|
|211||000703||7.3 New systems, new winners|
|214||000704||7.4 Theory of committee voting in the olden days|
|220||000705||7.5 Problems of Condorcet’s intuition|
|222||000706||7.6 Voting procedures|
|228||000707||7.7 Choice procedures and performance criteria|
|229||000708||7.8 Two social choice theorems|
|232||000709||7.9 Voting as a game|
|242||000710||7.10 Suggested reading|
|244||0008||8 Designing for elections and public goods provision|
|246||000801||8.1 The majority rule|
|251||000802||8.2 Majority and plurality|
|254||000803||8.3 Single transferable vote|
|257||000804||8.4 Quota and divisor methods|
|261||000805||8.5 Proportionality of what?|
|264||000806||8.6 The general design problem|
|267||000807||8.7 Optimizing the public goods provision|
|275||000808||8.8 Suggested reading|
|277||0009||9 What kind of government?|
|277||000901||9.1 States as bandits|
|279||000902||9.2 A just state|
|285||000903||9.3 Redistribution and rent seeking|
|287||000904||9.4 Suggested reading|
|289||0010||10 Aspects of policy evaluation|
|289||001001||10.1 Deciding the number of criteria|
|291||001002||10.2 Majorities, positions, weights|
|293||001003||10.3 Changes in alternative sets|
|295||001004||10.4 Close and yet so far|
|298||001005||10.5 One more criterion cannot do any harm, can it?|
|301||001006||10.6 Forest and the trees|
|306||001007||10.7 Voters are much the same as criteria|
|308||001008||10.8 Suggested reading|
|309||0011||11 Homo æconomicus: should we let him go?|
|403||0015||### 20211225 2*|
Smith’s view the task of political economy is to assist the rulers in providing well-being to their subjects and in securing the necessary means for running what would today be called the public sector. In Mill’s definition, what distinguishes political economy from household economy are the actors, not the activities. Both economies depend on the satisfaction of consumption and supply needs.
h.In Marx’s view it was rather the economic organization with its production relationships that determined the individual interests.
The neoclassical view of political economy agrees with the classic one in treating the economy as an analytically separable subsystem of the society, but introduces new philosophical and technical elements. To wit, the foundations of economic behavior were sought in the utilitarianism and marginal calculus was invented to explain the workings of the economies (see Caporaso and Levine 1992: 79–99).
Most definitions, however, share the idea of an interaction of two conceptually distinct societal subsystems – the political subsystem and the economic one.
We shall define political economy as the application of means–ends reasoning to behavior in the public realm.
The crucial concept of this text is that of decision. Political economy consists of structures, events, developments and patterns in which human decisions play a central role.
Theories have thus a double role in scholarly work: they present the achieved results (laws) in condensed form and, with the aid of empirical observations, allow for the evaluation of our knowledge.
speaking of a model rather than a theory, the person ipso facto believes that the description given in the model is not literally true, but a useful approximation.
Theoretical models include mathematical, statistical and computational ones.
the same study object may be modeled in several different ways depending on the use of the model (prediction, explanation or simulating past behavior)
Thus, thick rationality essentially extends the notion of rationality by imposing conditions upon goals and beliefs.