Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Illustrated)

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2,6074,314,phi,eng,20160828,20160928,5,Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Illustrated)
20160828-20160928, 314 pages, 5* SalesInfo o eng

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Sisällysluettelo Contents Содержание (Code: (1,2,3,4,5))

1750001 CONTENTS
1750002 Contents
1750003 Part I
1750004 Section I
1750005 Chap. I of Sympathy
1750006 Chap. II Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy
1750007 by their concord or dissonance with out own.
1750008 Chap. IV The same subject continued
1750009 Chap. V Of the amiable and respectable virtues
1750010 Section II Introduction
1750011 Chap.I Of the Passions which take their origin from the body
1750012 Chap. II Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination
1750013 Chap. III Of the unsocial Passions
1750014 Chap. IV Of the social Passions
1750015 Chap. V Of the selfish Passions
1750016 Section III
1750017 Chap. I
1750018 and of the distinction of Ranks
1750019 Chap. III
1750020 Part II
1750021 Section I Introduction
1750022 Chap. 1
1750023 Chap. II Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment
1750024 Chap. III
1750025 Chap. IV Recapitulation of the foregoing Chapters
1750026 Chap. V The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit
1750027 Section II
1750028 Chap. I Comparison of those two Virtues
401 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections
50101 Of the Sense of Propriety
5010101 of Sympathy
10010102 Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy
13010103 Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with out own.
15010104 The same subject continued
20010105 Of the amiable and respectable virtues
240102 Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety
24010201 Of the Passions which take their origin from the body
28010202 Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination
31010203 Of the unsocial Passions
36010204 Of the social Passions
38010205 Of the selfish Passions
40010206 Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition
410103 Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Aprobation in the one state than in the other
41010301 That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned
48010302 Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks
50010303 Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
57010304 Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition
6202 Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment Consisting of Three Parts
620201 Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
63020101 That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment appears to deserve punishment
64020102 Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment
67020103 That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it
69020104 IV Recapitulation of the foregoing Chapters
70020105 The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit
750202 Of Justice and Beneficence
75020201 Comparison of those two Virtues
80020202 Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit
83020203 Of the utility of this constitution of Nature
89020204 Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions
900203 Of the Causes of this Influence of Fortune
94020301 Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune
102020302 Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments
10503 Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty Consisting of One Section
105030003 Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation
109030004 Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness
126030005 Of the Influences and Authority of Conscience
148030006 Lauzun recovered tranquillity enough to be capable of amusing himself with feeding a spider. A mind better furnished would, perhaps, have both sooner recovered its tranquillity, and sooner found, in its own thoughts, a much better amusement.
153030007 Of the Influence and Authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity
162030008 In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole Principle of our Conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other Motives
17104 Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of Approbation Consisting of One Section
17105 3,Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon all the Productions of Art, and of the extensive Influence of this Species of Beauty
179050009 Of the Beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the Characters and Actions of Men; and how far the Perception of this Beauty may be regarded as one of the original Principles of approbation
18506 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation Consisting of One Section
185060010 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our notions of Beauty and Deformity
191060011 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments
20307 Of the Character of Virtue Consisting of Three Sections
2030701 Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence
2090702 Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People
210070201 Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our care and attention
219070202 Of the order in which Societies are by nature recommended to our Beneficence
226070203 Of universal Benevolence
2290703 Of Self-command
254070301 Conclusion of the Sixth Part
25708 Of Systems of Moral Philosophy Consisting of Four Sections
2570801 Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments
25809 Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue
2590901 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety
2840902 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence
2900903 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence
2970904 Of Licentious Systems
30510 Of the Different Systems which have been Formed Concerning the Principle of Approbation
3061001 Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love
3081002 Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation
3111003 Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation
3181004 Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality
33411 end

Muistiinpanot Highlights Примечание (Code: h)

1 (8)
Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it.
2 (10)
one of the most important principles in human nature, the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, but the great restraint upon the injustice of mankind, which, while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects the society.
3 (15)
Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them.
4 (21)
And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety. As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us.
5 (24)
1. It is indecent to express any strong degree of those passions which arise from a certain situation or disposition of the body; because the company, not being in the same disposition, cannot be expected to sympathize with them.
6 (25)
In the command of those appetites of the body consists that virtue which is properly called temperance.
7 (26)
2. It is for the same reason that to cry out with bodily pain, how intolerable soever, appears always unmanly and unbecoming.
8 (26)
The loss of a leg may generally be regarded as a more real calamity than the loss of a mistress.
9 (26)
Nothing is so soon forgot as pain.
10 (28)
Approbation, mixed and animated by wonder and surprise, constitutes the sentiment which is properly called admiration, of which, applause is the natural expression, as has already been observed.
11 (34)
When music imitates the modulations of grief or joy, it either actually inspires us with those passions, or at least puts us in the mood which disposes us to conceive them. But when it imitates the notes of anger, it inspires us with fear.
12 (41)
First of all, our sympathy with sorrow is, in some sense, more universal than that with joy.
13 (43)
What can he added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of debt, and has a clear conscience?
14 (48)
It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty. Nothing is so mortifying as to be obliged to expose our distress to the view of the public, and to feel, that though our situation is open to the eyes of all mankind, no mortal conceives for us the half of what we suffer. Nay, it is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty. For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? what is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and preheminence? Is it to supply the necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest labourer can supply them.
15 (57)
We desire both to be respectable and to be respected.
16 (57)
We frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous
17 (62)
Merit and Demerit, the qualities of deserving reward, and of deserving punishment.
18 (72)
Our sense of the horror and dreadful atrocity of such conduct, the delight which we take in hearing that it was properly punished, the indignation which we feel when it escapes this due retaliation, our whole sense and feeling, in short, of its ill desert, of the propriety and fitness of inflicting evil upon the person who is guilty of it, and of making him grieve in his turn, arises from the sympathetic indignation which naturally boils up in the breast of the spectator, whenever he thoroughly brings home to himself the case of the sufferer.
19 (73)
Revenge, therefore, the excess of resentment, appears to be the most detestable of all the passions, and is the object of the horror and indignation of every body.
20 (73)
The inspired writers would not surely have talked so frequently or so strongly of the wrath and anger of God, if they had regarded every degree of those passions as vicious and evil, even in so weak and imperfect a creature as man.
21 (76)
The man who does not recompense his benefactor when he has it in his power, and when his benefactor needs his assistance, is, no doubt, guilty of the blackest ingratitude.
22 (79)
We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing.
23 (79)
As every man doth, so shall it be done to him, and retaliation seems to be the great law which is dictated to us by Nature.
24 (79)
The violator of the laws of justice ought to be made to feel himself that evil which he has done to another; and since no regard to the sufferings of his brethren is capable of restraining him, he ought to be over-awed by the fear of his own.
25 (80)
There can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour, there can be no incitement to do evil to another, which mankind will go along with, except just indignation for evil which that other has done to us.
26 (81)
The most sacred laws of justice, therefore, those whose violation seems to call loudest for vengeance and punishment, are the laws which guard the life and person of our neighbour; the next are those which guard his property and possessions; and last of all come those which guard what are called his personal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others.
27 (107)
A man who is tolerably handsome, will allow you to laugh at any little irregularity in his person; but all such jokes are commonly unsupportable to one who is really deformed.
28 (109)
Emulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves should excel, is originally founded in our admiration of the excellence of others.
29 (110)
The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-worthiness.
30 (112)
To obtain that approbation where it is really due, may sometimes be an object of no great importance to him. But to be that thing which deserves approbation, must always be an object of the highest.
31 (113)
The love of just fame, of true glory, even for its own sake, and independent of any advantage which he can derive from it, is not unworthy even of a wise man.
32 (120)
Our uncertainty concerning our own merit, and our anxiety to think favourably of it, should together naturally enough make us desirous to know the opinion of other people concerning it; to be more than ordinarily elevated when that opinion is favourable, and to be more than ordinarily mortified when it is otherwise:
33 (122)
To show much anxiety about praise, even for praise-worthy actions, is seldom a mark of great wisdom, but generally of some degree of weakness.
34 (129)
The poor man must neither defraud nor steal from the rich, though the acquisition might be much more beneficial to the one than the loss could be hurtful to the other.
35 (140)
Lauzun recovered tranquillity enough to be capable of amusing himself with feeding a spider. A mind better furnished would, perhaps, have both sooner recovered its tranquillity, and sooner found, in its own thoughts, a much better amusement.
36 (157)
Those vice-gerents of God within us, never fail to punish the violation of them, by the torments of inward shame, and self-condemnation; and on the contrary, always reward obedience with tranquillity of mind, with contentment, and self-satisfaction.
37 (166)
A miser is as furious about a halfpenny, as a man of ambition about the conquest of a kingdom.
38 (176)
The homely and vulgar proverb, that the eye is larger than the belly, never was more fully verified than with regard to him.
39 (226)
They hold in contempt the divine maxim of Plato, and consider the state as made for themselves, not themselves for the state.
40 (254)
Concern for our own happiness recommends to us the virtue of prudence: concern for that of other people, the virtues of justice and beneficence;
41 (256)
The virtues of prudence, justice, and beneficence, have no tendency to produce any but the most agreeable effects.
42 (258)
According to others, virtue consists in the judicious pursuit of our own private interest and happiness, or in the proper government and direction of those selfish affections which aim solely at this end. In the opinion of these authors, therefore, virtue consists in prudence.
43 (259)
Another set of authors make virtue consist in those affections only which aim at the happiness of others, not in those which aim at our own. According to them, therefore, disinterested benevolence is the only motive which can stamp upon any action the character of virtue.
44 (262)
Thus we are said to do injustice to a poem or a picture, when we do not admire them enough, and we are said to do them more than justice when we admire them too much.
45 (263)
Thus the virtue of fortitude or courage lies in the middle between the opposite vices of cowardice and of presumptuous rashness, of which the one offends from being too much, and the other from being too little affected by the objects of fear.
46 (264)
Virtue, according to Plato, might be considered as a species of science, and no man, he thought, could see clearly and demonstratively what was right and what was wrong, and not act accordingly. Passion might make us act contrary to doubtful and uncertain opinions, not to plain and evident judgments.
47 (264)
Aristotle, on the contrary, was of opinion, that no conviction of the understanding was capable of getting the better of inveterate habits, and that good morals arose not from knowledge but from action.
48 (264)
III. According to Zeno, the founder of the Stoical doctrine, every animal was by nature recommended to its own care, and was endowed with the principle of self-love, that it might endeavour to preserve, not only its existence, but all the different parts of its nature, in the best and most perfect state of which they were capable.
49 (268)
Stoical wise man, all the events of human life must be in a great measure indifferent. His happiness consisted altogether, first, in the contemplation of the happiness and perfection of the great system of the universe, of the good government of the great republic of Gods and men, of all rational and sensible beings; and, secondly, in discharging his duty, in acting properly in the affairs of this great republic whatever little part that wisdom had assigned to him.
50 (269)
Our only anxious concern ought to be, not about the stake, but about the proper method of playing.
51 (278)
Death, too, is just as proper a termination of old age, as youth is of childhood, or manhood of youth. As we frequently say, he remarks upon another occasion, that the physician has ordered to such a man to ride on horseback,
52 (278)
As all, even the smallest of the co-existent parts of the universe, are exactly fitted to one another, and all contribute to compose one immense and connected system; so all, even apparently the most insignificant of the successive events which follow one another, make parts, and necessary parts, of that great chain of causes and effects which had no beginning, and which will have no end; and which, as they all necessarily result from the original arrangement and contrivance of the whole; so they are all essentially necessary, not only to its prosperity, but to its continuance and preservation.
53 (283)
That the Stoical philosophy had very great influence upon the character and conduct of its followers, cannot be doubted; and that though it might sometimes incite them to unnecessary violence, its general tendency was to animate them to actions of the most heroic magnanimity and most extensive benevolence.
54 (287)
Temperance, in short, was nothing but prudence with regard to pleasure.
55 (294)
from whence arises our approbation of the inferior virtues of prudence, vigilance, circumspection, temperance, constancy, firmness.
56 (295)
Benevolence may, perhaps, be the sole principle of action in the Deity, and there are several, not improbable, arguments which tend to persuade us that it is so.
57 (296)
Every affection is useful when it is confined to a certain degree of moderation; and every affection is disadvantageous when it exceeds the proper bounds.
58 (297)
But notwithstanding these defects, the general tendency of each of those three systems is to encourage the best and most laudable habits of the human mind: and it were well for society, if, either mankind in general, or even those few who pretend to live according to any philosophical rule, were to regulate their conduct by the precepts of any one of them. We may learn from each of them something that is both valuable and peculiar.
59 (298)
Epicurean system, borrows his most agreeable proofs that virtue alone is sufficient to secure happiness. Seneca, though a Stoic, the sect most opposite to that of Epicurus, yet quotes this philosopher more frequently than any other.
60 (299)
The first is the love of virtue, the noblest and the best passion in human nature. The second is the love of true glory, a passion inferior no doubt to the former, but which in dignity appears to come immediately after it.
61 (316)
The word moral sense is of very late formation, and cannot yet be considered as making part of the English tongue. The word approbation has but within these few years been appropriated to denote peculiarly any thing of this kind. In propriety of language we approve of whatever is entirely to our satisfaction, of the form of a building, of the contrivance of a machine, of the flavour of a dish of meat.
62 (324)
Treachery and falsehood are vices so dangerous, so dreadful, and, at the same time, such as may so easily, and, upon many occasions, so safely be indulged, that we are more jealous of them than of almost any other.
63 (324)
The doctrine of the casuists, however, is by no means confined to the consideration of what a conscientious regard to the general rules of justice would demand of us. It embraces many other parts of Christian and moral duty. What seems principally to have given occasion to the cultivation of this species of science was the custom of auricular confession, introduced by the Roman Catholic superstition, in times of barbarism and ignorance. By that institution, the most secret actions, and even the thoughts of every person, which could be suspected of receding in the smallest degree from the rules of Christian purity, were to be revealed to the confessor. The confessor informed his penitents whether, and in what respect they had violated their duty, and what penance it behoved them to undergo, before he could absolve them in the name of the offended Deity.
64 (326)
The breaches of moral duty, therefore, which came before the tribunal of the confessor, and upon that account fell under the cognizance of the casuists, were chiefly of three different kinds.
65 (326)
First and principally, breaches of the rules of justice.
66 (326)
Secondly, breaches of the rules of chastity. These in all grosser instances are real breaches of the rules of justice, and no person can be guilty of them without doing the most unpardonable injury to some other..
67 (327)
Thirdly, breaches of the rules of veracity. The violation of truth, it is to be observed, is not always a breach of justice, though it is so upon many occasions, and consequently cannot always expose to any external punishment. The vice of common lying, though a most miserable meanness, may frequently do hurt to nobody, and in this case no claim of vengeance or satisfaction can be due either to the persons imposed upon, or to others.
68 (327)
The desire of being believed, the desire of persuading, of leading and directing other people, seems to be one of the strongest of all our natural desires.
69 (328)
Frankness and openness conciliate confidence.
70 (332)
The two useful parts of moral philosophy, therefore, are Ethics and Jurisprudence:
71 (332)
Every system of positive law may be regarded as a more or less imperfect attempt towards a system of natural jurisprudence, or towards an enumeration of the particular rules of justice.

Sanasto Vocabulary Словарь (Code: w)

1 raillery (37)
2 jilted (41)
3 indulgent (47)
4 hovel (48)
5 adulation (50)
6 preheminence (51)
7 coxcomb (52)
8 humane (54)
9 emulation (58)
10 gaudy (58)
11 gores (92)
lävistää sarvellaan
12 chuses (99)
13 gibbet (115)
14 splenetic (122)
15 paroxysm of distress (148)
kohtaus hädässä
16 kohtaus hädässä (153)
17 knave (158)
18 profligate (216)
19 palliatives (225)
20 rapturous (230)
21 ostentation (247)
22 unanealed (251)
23 concupiscible (260)
24 indulgence of those passions (303)
suopeutta nämä intohimoja,

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Yhteenvedot Reviews Резюме (Code: ###)

Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Illustrated)
2,6074,314,phi,eng,20160828,20160928,5,Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Illustrated)
20160828-20160928, 314 pages, 5* SalesInfo o eng

Excellent book with imroved Kindle

There are two aspects in this review. One is about the book and the other about Amazon's contribution to the Revolution in Reading.

First of all the book. I am reading Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments the second time and the second time preparing my MyeBooks notes on it. It will be interesting to compare those two in my system of no less than the Revolution in Learning. As professor of economics I have also read Adam Smith's even more famous book The Wealth of Nations, even if half a century later than I should have. His easily recognizable very personal way of writing and suffocating the reader with, least to say, proliferous zunami of detailed text is at the same time entertaining and really suffocating. But also completely convincing. They say about some political leaders that they have the Nile or an Amazon of thoughts. Adam Smith, too. He would deserve of being a big political boss. As he in reality also is. The best economic policy is conducted on the basis of his still valid thoughts on economics, which in turn are based on his Theory of Moral Sentiments presented in this book. No need, and no competence to go into the mydiad of details here. Overwhelming.

Secondly, some words about my first experience with Amazon's new improvements of Kindle. During the five years I have been using Kindle, it has changed, improved a lot. Many times I have had the feeling that Amazon has taken into account the suggestions I have made in my feedback. Perhaps, perhaps not needed, because they have been so obvious that anybody could have requested them and Amazon's skilled programmers could have worked on their own.

Two big improvements I see first time in this book. I do not know the proper term, but name it the 'surrounded screen'. And the X-ray property. By introducing the ingenious toggling between full screen and surrounded screen has brought to the ebook one of the still missing properties of paper book: 'leafing around'. Making the reading a cosy event. I would say that I alternate big screen and surrounded about half and half of the time. It is astonishing that the surrounded can really be read without trouble although it is given with remarkably smaller font. l use the surrounded for speedy reading, seem to grasp the whole screen with one glance, somehow picking the beef quicly, or use surrounded for speeding uninteresting spots of text.

The X-ray property is an excellent supplement for constant looking up in Wiki. An improvement to lookups, because there are summaries of several lookups and sorted list of persons, events etc. But Amazon could easily take a couple of further cock steps forwards. Google maps could be provided in connection to place names. With the fine properties of measuring distance, showing road and giving prepared information in pictures and summaries.

But then there is not but a cock step, but a big leap to be made by Amazon to make Kindle another Revolution of Learning. Not just looking up words in dictionaries but also saving for future needs and memorizing the word definitions just as I have made in MyeBooks.
Five stars without any hesitation.


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