Korpela Asko 
16 Russell's philosophy

• Problems of Philosophy, a small book, written in
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Problems of Philosophy, a small book, written in 1912. Reading it first time I was very enthusiastic about it: what a nice book, a good introduction to philosophy! Now, reading it second time, much more thoroughly (actually second and third time) and writing comments on each chapter, I feel that the book lost a lot of its splendour. It seldom happens this way, usually the other way round. 

My co-readers found surprisingly much matter for criticism. They even said that it is not clear, what Russell aimed to say. Or that he continues his boring treatment and should finally change the subject. - And I did not disagree. Then some one said that yes this is the guy from sixties who fought against windmills and all governments of the world with his utopistic red ideas of peace. I also remember that and again cannot disagree, although I remember also his outspoken clearness. Maybe I also was inclined to agree with his ideas. - Anyway, all these small pieces of criticism from the reading circle opened my own eyes to look Russell's text a little more critically. And I had also difficulties in understanding, found limits of my spiritual capacity, the message of some chapters remained unclear. Reading first time I cannot, of course, have understood better. - This all disturbed me in the course of the reading. 

But on the other hand, I pay notice to the fact that we as a group have written not less, but more personal comments than what used to be, although the number of pages of text to be read weekly was very small, scarcely one quarter of the usual. 
 

1. I find that the message of the first chapter is that no immediate knowledge or truth exists, but our knowledge about truth is based on sense data. Nothing is what it looks like. Philosophy does not give answers to questions, but instructs us to make good questions. 
2. In the problem of the existence of matter Russell ends up to intuitive beliefs. The existence of matter relies on these beliefs. Russell says that of these must be formed a hierarchy, strong beliefs topmost. And further a system has to be formed, a harmonious system. 
3. Existence is independent of us. A table does not cease to exist, when our sensation of it ceases. When we recognize that matter is different from our sensation of it, we can still make another distinction: that our sense data belong to the privacy of us all, whereas matter as such is common 'property', independent of private. 
4. In the fourth chapter a kind of 'either - or' solution is attempted: all existing is either matter or idea. Would not Platon's idea be good: there is a 'universal' idea and a corresponding 'particular' case, of which many exist and which are special cases of the universal idea and approach it with small exceptions and deficiencies. 
5. … or must we be content to the former prime minister Rafael Paasio's word: 'The case is investigated, thus nothing is known of it.' Is this the way to Socrates' piece of wisdom: 'I know that I don't know anything. Or Wittgestein's conclusion: 'Whereof one cannot speak, one must remain silent'. If this is the result, what is the use of knowledge? Is there any joy of knowledge? Maybe one must be able to love knowledge even if no use or joy is available. Maybe it is not necessary that I drop the hobby of my years of retirement even if I do not understand the essence of knowledge. And if I do not aspire for power, what could I do with knowledge? 
6. What might Popper have thought of Russell or what was Russell's opinion of Popper? Popper was born in 1902, so that… It sounds as if Russell had read Popper: "The belief that the sun will rise to-morrow might be falsified if the earth came suddenly into contact with a large body which destroyed its rotation". So, or has Popper (the inventor of falsification hypothesis) read Russell? Who is the cause and who is the effect? 
7. How was mathematics invented? The truth: two plus two makes four? Maybe first particular cases, pairs of two. Somebody learned that two stones and other two stones make four stones, two eggs plus two eggs make four eggs together. One can imagine afterwards that the concrete contents of these particular cases suddenly lost its significance: eggs or stones, anything, just that there be two and two. A general principle was born. Knowledge was looked the other way round: at first a general principle: two and two makes four, then some special cases: stones, eggs, anything. 
8. 'Pure mathematics is born (on the basis of experience) from particular cases.' According to Russell this is an erroneous statement, because a. The statement 'two plus two make four' cannot be proven by induction. b. To prove the statement 'two plus two make four' only one case is needed. Additional cases do not add information or certainty. Here the problem arises, because the mathematical statement is general, whereas all empirical knowledge is particular cases. How could we have knowledge of particular cases. 
9. Platon considers in ay case the world of ideas as more real and solid than the world we see around us. The visible world around us is full of indefinite applications of the world of ideas'. The basis of the world of ideas is solid logic, if also it is easy to see the world of ideas as mysticism and imagine that the ideas are in heaven. The contrary or better: the parallel of 'universal' is 'particular'. In economics the corresponding concepts would be 'macro' and 'micro', as I would understand. 
10. The difference between the knowledge based on sense data and intuition. Sense data as such does not contain error. Sensation is what is observed. It is different, if wrong conclusions are inferred on the basis of sense data. Then error comes into the picture. Intuitive knowledge contains error right from the beginning. An intuitive knowledge is in some sense a 'summary conception' of the reality. 
11. Russell adds to the pot as spice the 'belief', particularly the belief that is based on other beliefs. The foundation is forgotten or not considered at all. That is what intuition is. To it is come by starting from some everyday general belief and digging to its background sooner or later some general principle is found, which is completely obvious and cannot be inferred from any other principle. 
12. We come to a correspondence between the knowledge by acquaintance and facts. It is there where you have to find the characteristics of truth. Knowledge by acquaintance cannot concern one thing only, but concerns the relation of at least two things. In some cases even two objects are not enough. 
13. There are differences of degree in the validity of knowledge. More and less certain knowledge exist. It would be good to know about the degree of validity of knowledge. Usually there is no way of getting information about the validity of knowledge. Knowledge acquired by statistical methods offers the possibility of finding the limits of the validity of knowledge, limits of error can be measured. This is a subject that Russell does not touch at all. I am wondering why? Was the statistical theory not far enough developed, when Russell wrote his book? Or does the statistical theory not have the value, which I imagine it has? 
14. In order to arise doubt we must have some knowledge to be doubted. Even the methodical doubt of Descartes emerged from knowledge. Everything was doubtful, even existence, but not thinking. I think, hence I exist… and so on 'hook after hook'. 
15. The outcome from reading this book is the statement that philosophy is a kind of residual. It is what is left from original, when all such disciplines have been separated from it that have found clear-cut foundations, clear questions, clear methods. Philosophy has been left with unclear matters and has made for itself a virtue of questioning everything and invention of questions and not finding answers.

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